Unemployment benefits extensions at the zero lower bound on nominal interest rate

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Abstract

In this paper we investigate the impact of the recent US unemployment benefits extension on the labor market dynamics when the nominal interest rate is held at the zero lower bound (ZLB). Using a New Keynesian model, our quantitative experiments suggest that, in contrast to the existing literature that ignores the liquidity trap situation, the unemployment benefits extension slightly reduces unemployment at the ZLB. Outside the ZLB, it has adverse effects on unemployment, meaning that unemployment insurance benefits should be adjusted according to the macroeconomic conditions if the aim is to reduce unemployment. Furthermore, the ZLB amplifies the labor market downturn. An unconstrained monetary policy rule, i.e negative nominal interest rate, could have reduced the unemployment rate by around 1 percentage point in the trough of the recession.

Keywords: Zero lower bound, New Keynesian models, Search and Matching frictions, Monetary policy, Unemployment benefits extensions.

JEL Classification: E24, E31, E32, E43, E52, E62

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1 Introduction

Following the dramatic increase of the US unemployment rate during the Great Recession, policy makers have triggered an unprecedented unemployment insurance (UI) benefits extension. The benefit duration increased up to 99 weeks from the standard 26 weeks. This policy has been frequently pointed out as an important factor in exacerbating unemployment because it reduces job search and job acceptance. However, most of the discussion has left aside the economic environment in which the policy has been conducted. The fall in aggregate demand and the deflation have driven the economy in a liquidity trap where the nominal interest rate is pinned at the zero lower bound (ZLB). Several studies show that when the monetary policy losses traction, the impact of various fiscal policies can be quantitatively and qualitatively different (Eggertsson (2010), Christiano et al. (2011), Erceg & Lindé (2013)). Therefore, the role of the benefits extension as a fiscal stimulus must be questioned. In this paper we use a New Keynesian DSGE model to investigate the extend to which the benefits extension is responsible for the increase in unemployment when the behavior of the nominal interest rate is taken into account. We exploit aggregate data about unemployment insurance to quantify the stimulus plan and perform counterfactual experiments to identify the effects of unemployment benefits and the ZLB.

The UI extension has been widely criticized on behalf of the standard disincentive effects on job search decisions. Barro (2010), for instance, argues that it subsidized unemployment and led to insufficient job search and job acceptance. According to his own calculations the jobless rate could be as low as 6.8%, instead of 9.5% if jobless benefits hadn’t been extended to 99 weeks. Empirical studies found, however, a much more modest value. Rothstein (2011) shows that UI extensions raised the unemployment rate in early 2011 by only about 0.1 to 0.5 percentage point, Fujita (2011) by about 0.8 to 1.8 and Farber & Valletta (2013) by 0.4. Interestingly, Hagedorn et al. (2013) show that the response of the job finding rate mainly explains the persistent increase in unemployment while the search intensity plays little role. They argue that the wage pressure induced by the benefits extension would have reduced the incentive for firms to invest in job creation. In a general equilibrium framework, Nakajima (2012) found that the 2009 UI extension has raised the unemployment rate by 1.4 percentage points. On the opposite, Krugman (2013) argues that slashing unemployment benefits - which would have the side effect of reducing incomes and hence consumer spending - would not create more jobs but just make the situation worse because employment is limited by demand, not supply.

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Do extended benefits have different effects in a liquidity trap? In the literature presented above, the study of unemployment benefits abstracts from the liquidity trap situation and macro models assumes that the recession is driven by productivity shocks. This is at odds with the data since negative supply shocks cause an inflationary pressure and can not affect the interest rate in a way that mimics the financial market turmoils. As mentioned by Hall (2011) and Hall (2013), in a liquidity trap, the high level of the real interest rate discourages employers to invest in all type of investment. In particular, it decreases employers’ expected payoff from taking on new workers, thereby reducing hirings. On the other side, the role of fiscal policies has received a renewed interest since the transmission mechanisms are highly affected in a liquidity trap. For instance, Christiano et al. (2011) and Carrillo & Poilly (2013) documented that the government spending multiplier is larger (than one) when the ZLB on nominal interest rate binds. In general, Eggertsson (2010) argues that the impact of a fiscal intervention hinges on its ability to create an inflationary pressure because it reduces the real interest rate.

If, as mentioned by Hagedorn et al. (2013), the UI extension has increased wages, its effects on unemployment are non-trivial in a liquidity trap. On one hand, it lowers the search intensity and increases wages, which makes employers less prone to invest in job creation. On the other hand, the increase in wages involves an inflationary pressure which reduces the real interest rate. The overall impact depends on whether the latter effect dominates the formers. Our results suggest that the outcome of the UI extension is strongly linked to the response of the real interest rate. While an increase in unemployment benefits always raises the unemployment rate in normal times, it may have opposite effects in a liquidity trap. The counterfactual experiment shows that the unemployment benefits extension has slightly reduced unemployment when the nominal interest rate had reached the ZLB. Since the benefits extension has been triggered before the nominal interest rate reached the ZLB, it has increased unemployment early in the crisis but reduced it thereafter. In a robustness analysis we use alternative specifications of unemployment benefits and alternative calibrations of search intensity, labor market frictions and real wage rigidities. It is shown that the UI extension, even in the worst case considered, does not cause a sizeable increase in unemployment as long as the interest rate is held at the ZLB. In addition, we show that the ZLB account for 20% of the rise in unemployment.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the presentation of the New Keynesian DSGE model. Section 3 addresses calibration. Simulations and counterfactual experiments are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. We provide a separate appendix describing unemployment benefits multipliers, the model, the calibration and the solution method.
2 The model

We use a baseline New Keynesian DSGE model with search and matching frictions (Mortensen & Pissarides (1994)). The model is characterized by nominal price rigidities (Rotemberg’s style), monopolistic competition, and a feedback Taylor rule for monetary policy. We focus on the flow of workers between employment and unemployment. Time is discrete and our economy is populated by homogeneous workers and firms. Producing firms are large and employ many workers as their only input into the production process. Labor may be adjusted through the extensive margin (employment), individual hours are fixed. Wages are the outcome of a bilateral Nash bargaining process between each large firm and each worker. We calibrate the model on US data. Aggregate shocks to the discount factor fuel up the cycle.

2.1 The labor market

The search process and recruiting activities are costly and time-consuming for firms and workers. A job may either be filled and productive, or unfilled and unproductive. To fill their vacant jobs, firms publish adverts and screen workers, incurring hiring expenditures. Workers are identical and they may either be employed or unemployed. The number of matches, \( m_t \), is given by the following CES matching function\(^1\):

\[
m_t = \left( (e_t s_t)^{-\gamma} + v_t^{-\gamma} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} \leq \min(e_t s_t, v_t) \quad (1)
\]

where \( v_t \geq 0 \) denotes the mass of vacancies, \( s_t \geq 0 \) represents the mass of searching workers and \( e_t \geq 0 \) stands for the endogenous search effort. The labor force, \( L \), is assumed to be constant over time. Assuming \( L = 1 \) allows us to treat aggregate labor market variables in number and rate without distinction. The matching function (1) is increasing and concave in its two arguments. A vacancy is filled with probability \( q_t = m_t / v_t \) and the job finding probability per efficiency units of worker search is \( f_t = m_t / (e_t s_t) \).

2.2 The sequence of events

Following Hall (2005), we abstract from job destruction decisions by assuming that in each period a fixed proportion of existing jobs is exogenously destroyed.

\(^1\)The use of a CES matching function, instead of the standard Cobb-Douglas, allows to evaluate how a change in the degree of matching frictions affects our results. The CES encompasses the Cobb-Douglas case. An increase in \( \gamma \) reduces the mismatches and frictions. If \( \gamma \to +\infty, m_t = \min(s_t, v_t) \) which is a frictionless hiring process. Furthermore, it ensures that the job finding and filling probabilities remain below 1.
at rate $\rho^x$. $n_t$ denotes employment in period $t$. It has two components: new and old workers. New employment relationships are formed through the matching process in period $t$. The number of job seekers is given by:

$$s_t = 1 - (1 - \rho^x)n_{t-1}$$

This definition has two major consequences. First, it allows workers who lose their job in period $t$ to have a probability of being employed in the same period. Second, it allows the model to make a distinction between job seekers and unemployed workers $u_t = 1 - n_t$. The latter receive unemployment benefits.

The employment law of motion is given by:

$$n_t = (1 - \rho^x)n_{t-1} + m_t$$

### 2.3 The representative household

There is a continuum of identical households indexed by $i \in [0, 1]$. Each household may be viewed as a large family. There is a perfect risk sharing, family members pool their incomes (labor incomes and unemployment benefits) that are equally redistributed. We suppose that households have preference over different consumption varieties. Good varieties are indexed by $j \in [0, 1]$. Each household maximizes the aggregate consumption using a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of differentiated goods $c_{jt}$ and faces the following demand function$^2$:

$$c_{jt} = \left( \frac{p_{jt}}{p_t} \right)^{-\epsilon} c_t$$

which describes the optimal level of $c_{jt}$ and where $c_t$ is aggregate consumption. The nominal price index is defined by $p_t = \left[ \int_0^1 p_{jt}^{-\epsilon} dj \right]^{1/\epsilon}$. The second problem that households solve is the maximization of aggregate consumption $c_t$:

$$\max_{\Omega^H_t} E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left( \prod_{k=0}^{t} \beta_k \right) \left[ c_t^{1-\sigma} - \epsilon_n^{H_t + 1 + \phi} \right]$$

$n_t$ is the level of employment supplied by households. The parameters $\sigma > 0$ and $1 + \phi > 0$ denote the coefficient of risk aversion and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity, respectively. $\beta_t$ represents a discount factor shock. The representative household chooses the set of processes $\Omega^H_t = \{c_t, \epsilon_t, d_t, n_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ taking

$^2$We skip intermediary equations since they are standard.
as given the set of processes \( \{ p_t, w_t, i_t, f_t \} \) and the initial wealth \( (d_0) \) so as to maximize their utility subject to the budget constraint:

\[
p_t s_t k(e_t) + p_t e_t + d_t = d_{t-1} (1 + i_{t-1}) + w_t n_t + (1 - n_t) b_t + \Pi_t + T_t \tag{6}
\]

and the law of motion of employment:

\[
n_t = (1 - \rho^x) n_{t-1} + f_t s_t e_t \tag{7}
\]

\( k(e_t) \) is the cost of searching a job for a job seeker. \( d_t \) is the household’s holding of one period domestic bonds at date \( t \). The corresponding nominal interest rate is \( i_t \). \( w_t \) is the nominal wage level. \( \Pi_t \) represents profits from holding shares in domestic goods firms. \( T_t \) is a lump-sum tax and \( b_t \) denotes unemployment benefits. The optimality conditions of the household’s problem are:

\[
\varphi_t = \lambda_t \left( w_t^R - b_t^R \right) - \ell n_t^R + E_t \beta_{t+1} (1 - \rho^x) (k(e_{t+1}) \lambda_{t+1} + (1 - f_{t+1} e_{t+1}) \varphi_{t+1}) \tag{9}
\]

\[
\lambda_t = c_t^{-\sigma} \tag{10}
\]

\[
\lambda_t = (1 + i_t) E_t \beta_{t+1} \lambda_{t+1} \frac{p_t}{p_{t+1}} \tag{11}
\]

\[
k'(e_t) = \varphi_t \frac{f_t}{\lambda_t} \tag{12}
\]

Equation (9) is the marginal value of employment for a worker where \( w_t^R = w_t / p_t \) and \( b_t^R = b_t / p_t \) denotes the real wage and the real unemployment benefits level respectively. \( \lambda_t \) is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. Equation (11) defines the standard Euler equation and (12) stands for the optimal searching strategy.

### 2.4 Firms

There is a continuum of producers in a monopolistically competitive market indexed by \( j \). They use labor as their only input and sell output to the representative household. They face quadratic price adjustment costs (Rotemberg-style). The production function of a firm \( j \) using a fraction \( n_{jt} \) of total employment such that \( \int_0^1 n_{jt} dj = n_t \) is given by:

\[
y_{jt} = n_{jt}^\alpha \tag{13}
\]

\( \alpha \) is the employment share of production in the consumption good. The optimization problem of the firm \( j \) consists in choosing the set of processes \( \Omega_{jt} = \)
\{v_{jt}, p_{jt}, n_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ taking as given the set of processes $\{p_t, w_{jt}, q_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$. Each producer maximizes the following intertemporal function:

$$\max_{\Omega_t} E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left( \prod_{k=0}^{t} \beta_k \right) \frac{\lambda_t}{\lambda_0} \Pi_{jt}$$

(14)

where $\Pi_{jt} = \left[ \frac{p_{jt}}{p_t} y_{jt} - \frac{w_{jt}}{p_t} n_{jt} - \kappa v_{jt} - y_t \Gamma(\pi_{jt}) \right]$

subject to the production function (13) and the following evolution of employment:

$$n_{jt} = (1 - \rho^x)n_{jt-1} + q_t v_{jt}.$$  

(15)

$p_{jt}/p_t$ is the relative price which coincides with the marginal cost. As in Rotemberg, adjusting prices incurs a cost:

$$\Gamma(\pi_{jt}) = \frac{\psi^2}{2} \left( \frac{p_{jt}}{p_{jt-1}} - 1 \right)^2.$$  

(16)

This cost is assumed to be proportional to the output level $y_t$. Inflation is defined as the gross inflation rate $\pi_t = p_t/p_{t-1}$. $\psi$ is the price adjustment cost parameter and $\pi$ is the steady state inflation. Hiring is costly and incurs a cost $\kappa$ per vacancy posted (with $\int_0^1 v_{jt}dj = v_t$). It is paid by the firm as long as the job remains unfilled. Since all firms choose the same price and the same number of vacancies in equilibrium we can drop the index $j$ by symmetry. The optimality conditions of the above problem are:

$$q_t \mu_t = \kappa$$  

(17)

$$\mu_t = m c_t \alpha \frac{y_t}{n_t} - w_t R + (1 - \rho^x) E_t \beta_{t+1} \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \mu_{t+1}$$  

(18)

$$0 = (1 - \epsilon) + \epsilon m c_t - \psi \frac{\pi_t}{\pi} \left( \frac{\pi_t}{\pi} - 1 \right)$$

$$+ E_t \beta_{t+1} \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \psi \frac{\pi_{t+1}}{\pi} \left( \frac{\pi_{t+1}}{\pi} - 1 \right) \frac{y_{t+1}}{y_t}$$

(19)

where $\mu_t$ is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the employment evolution that gives the expected marginal value of a job for the firm$^3$. $m c_t$ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the individual consumption demand. Combining the two first-order conditions (17) and (18) gives the job creation condition:

$$\frac{\kappa}{q_t} = m c_t \alpha \frac{y_t}{n_t} - w_t R + (1 - \rho^x) E_t \beta_{t+1} \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \frac{\kappa}{q_{t+1}}$$

(20)

$^3$It is obtained by taking the derivative of (14) w.r.t $n_t$. 

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This condition shows that the expected gain from hiring a new worker is equal to the average cost of search (which is the marginal cost of a vacancy times the average duration of a vacancy $1/q_t$).

### 2.4.1 Wage setting

In equilibrium filled jobs generate a return (the firm marginal value of the job $\mu_t$ plus the worker marginal value of the job $\varphi_t$) greater than the surplus from a vacant job and from an unemployed worker. Nominal wages are determined through an individual Nash bargaining process between each worker and his employer who share the total surplus of the match. The outcome of the bargaining process is given by the solution of the following maximization problem:

$$\max_{w_t} \left( \frac{\varphi_t}{\lambda_t} \right)^{1-\xi} \mu_t^{\xi}$$

(21)

The optimality condition of the above problems is given by:

$$\xi \frac{\varphi_t}{\lambda_t} = (1 - \xi) \mu_t$$

(22)

where $\xi \in [0, 1]$ and $1 - \xi$ denote the firms and workers bargaining power respectively. Using the definition of $\mu_t$ and $\varphi_t$, we have

$$w_t^R = (1 - \xi) \left( mc_t \frac{\alpha}{n_t} + E_t \beta_t \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} (1 - \rho^x) \kappa_e e_{t+1} \right)$$

$$+ \xi \left( b_t^R + \frac{\ell n_t^f}{\lambda_t} - E_t \beta_t \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} k(e_{t+1}) \right)$$

(23)

As it is standard in matching models, the real wage is a weighted sum of the worker’s outside option and their contribution to the product.

### 2.5 The monetary and fiscal authorities

We assume that the central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate $i_t$ in response to deviations of inflation and output from their steady-state value according to a Taylor-type rule:

$$1 + i_t = \begin{cases} 
(1 + i_{t-1})^{\rho_i} \left( \frac{\pi}{\pi^*} \right)^{\rho_p} \left( \frac{y}{y^*} \right)^{\rho_y} \left( 1 - \rho_i \right) & \text{if } i_t > 0 \\
1 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}$$

(24)
We assume that unemployment benefits are proportional to the aggregate wage and obey to the following rule:

\[ b_t^K = \tau_t w_t \] (25)

where \( \tau_t \) is the replacement rate. \( \tau_t \) follows an AR(1) process. The fiscal authority finances unemployment benefits \( b_t \) through the lump-sum tax \( T_t \). Formally the fiscal budget rule satisfies:

\[ d_t + b_t (1 - n_t) = (1 + i_{t-1}) d_{t-1} + T_t \] (26)

### 2.6 Market clearing

The aggregation of individual profits \( \Pi_t \) is given by:

\[ \Pi_t = p_t y_t - n_t w_t - p_t y_t \Gamma_t^{\pi} \] (27)

Equation (26) together with the budget constraint (6) and the profit (27) give the aggregate resource constraint:

\[ y_t \left[ 1 - \frac{\psi}{2} \left( \frac{\pi_t}{\pi} - 1 \right)^2 \right] = c_t + \kappa v_t + s_t k(c_t) \] (28)

### 3 Model calibration

Quarterly frequencies are assumed in our calibration. The benchmark calibration is standard and follows Christiano et al. (2011), Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2012), Aruoba & Schorfheide (2013). The model is solved using a Parameterized Expectation Algorithm (PEA) with regime switching.

**Preferences, production and shocks:** We set the steady state discount factor to 0.996 and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity to 1. The risk aversion coefficient \( \sigma \) is set to 1 and, following the standard approach, the elasticity of substitution between goods \( \epsilon = 6 \), which gives a gross markup of about 1.2. The elasticity of output with respect to employment (\( \alpha \)) is equal to 1 in our benchmark. \( \beta_t \) follows an AR(1) process: \( \log \beta_t = \rho_\beta \log \beta_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_\beta) \log \beta + \sigma_\beta \epsilon_t^\beta \) where \( \rho_\beta = 0.85 \) and \( \sigma_\beta = 0.002 \) in order to match the average time spent at the ZLB of 5%.

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4 The ZLB can not be accurately studied using linear-approximation methods, see Braun et al. (2012) for comparison. A full description of the algorithm is provided in the separate appendix.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discount factor</td>
<td>( \beta )</td>
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<tr>
<td>Risk av. coefficient</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elast. of subst. between goods</td>
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<td>Frisch elasticity</td>
<td>( \phi )</td>
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<td>Production function elasticity</td>
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<td>Autocorr. coefficient</td>
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<td>FGGR</td>
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<td>( \sigma_{\beta} )</td>
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<td>Target 5pct at the ZLB</td>
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<td>Target ( \kappa v \simeq 0.01 y )</td>
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<td>( \eta )</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disutility of search</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disutility of labor</td>
<td>( \ell )</td>
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<td>Deduced</td>
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<td>Replacement rate</td>
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<td>Matching frictions</td>
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<td>( \simeq ) Calvo 0.75</td>
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Table 1: **Parameters for the benchmark** P: Pissarides & Petrongolo (2001), FGGR: Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2012).

**Labor market, stocks and flows:** The US unemployment rate \( u \) is 5.5% on average over several decades. We set the probability of being unemployed \( \rho^x = 10.61\% \) as in the data. At the steady state, the number of matches must be equal to the number of separations: \( m = \rho^x n \) with \( n = 1 - u = 94.5 \). We get the number of job seekers from the definition \( s = 1 - (1 - \rho^x) n \). Setting \( e = 1 \), involves a job finding rate \( f = m/(es) = 64.6\% \) and a hiring rate \( m/n = 10.61\% \), close to the data (10.65%) from the BLS. Following Andolfatto (1996), the rate at which a firm fills a vacancy is about 0.9. From the CES matching function, \( \gamma \) is calculated in such a way that \( q = 0.9 \). It follows that \( v = m/q \). According to Pissarides & Petrongolo (2001) \( \xi = 0.5 \). The costs of posting vacancies \( \kappa \) is about less than 1% of the GDP. Following Merz (1995), the cost of search takes the form: \( k(e) = k_0 e^\eta \) with \( k_0 > 0 \) and \( \eta > 1 \). We first assume that \( \eta = 2 \). We come back later to this assumption. The remaining parameters \( \ell \) and \( k_0 \) are set to balance the steady state real wage equation (23) and the optimal search strategy equation (12).

**Monetary and fiscal policy:** Inflation at the steady state is about 2% on an an-
nual basis on average. With $\beta$ being equal to 0.996, the Euler equation involves an annual steady state nominal interest rate of 3.6% and a real interest rate of about 1.6%. Prices adjust infrequently. We assume that $\psi = 90$ which corresponds to a Calvo parameter of 0.75 when $\epsilon = 6$ in the log-linearized Phillips Curve, as it is standard. From popular DSGE estimations, we have $\rho_\pi = 1.5$, and $\rho_y = 0.25$. $\rho_i$ is set to match the path of the nominal interest rate over 1998Q4-2013Q2, especially the period of ZLB. We found that $\rho_i = 0.6$ which is less than conventional values found in estimations but still consistent with the rapid decline of the interest rate in 2008. Finally, we assume that the replacement ratio $\tau_t$ follows an AR(1) process: $\log \tau_t = \rho_\tau \log \tau_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_\tau) \log \tau + \sigma_{\tau} \epsilon^\tau_t$. We adopt a modified version of the OECD methodology to calculate the steady state replacement rate. It is found to be equal to 0.15. The volatility and the persistence of the AR(1) are determined according to the time series we built (see appendix for details). The calibration is summarized in Table 1.

4 Quantitative evaluation of the model

4.1 How does the ZLB impact the economy?

We first present some intuitive results on the ZLB. To understand how the ZLB impacts the labor market, we compute the response of the variables following a sufficiently large demand shock to send the economy to the ZLB (see Figure 1). The size of the shock is calibrated to match the observed increase in unemployment. It reached 10% in October 2009. In our model such a shock involves a fall in output of 5% and a fall in the quarterly gross inflation rate of about 1.5%, broadly consistent with the data. The implied ZLB spell is equal to six quarters. Firms cut vacancies by around 45% which is a similar decrease in the data between 2007Q4 and 2009Q4. The real interest rate increases on impact and gently returns to its equilibrium value.

The red dotted line shows the response of the variables if the nominal interest rate is not constrained by the ZLB. It is shown that the ZLB amplifies the propagation of the labor market downturn. Without any binding constraint, the nominal interest rate falls to -2.5% which implies a decrease in the real interest rate and limits the increase in unemployment. Basically, with high real interest rates the aggregate demand falls. The expected payoff to an employer from hiring new workers declines. It results in a decrease in employers’ incentives to invest in job creation and to open vacancies. Then, the initial fall in vacancies and in the hiring rate are lower without the ZLB. The faster stabilization in real wage dampens the decrease in the marginal cost and the deflationary pressure. Search intensity falls less than in the constrained case. The drop in output is found to be larger (about 1% point) on impact and on the subsequent periods when the economy is constrained by the ZLB.
4.2 Unemployment benefits multipliers

Before running the counterfactual experiments we show preliminary results on the fiscal multiplier resulting from a one-period and temporary increase in the replacement rate. Figure 2 shows two types of multipliers\(^5\): the marginal multiplier and the cumulative multiplier. The first one measures the marginal output gain from an increase in unemployment benefits and the second discounts and sums up to date the whole output gain since unemployment benefits have increased.

In the standard DMP model, an increase in the unemployment benefits raises the workers’ outside option, which is the present value of being unemployed. It strengthens workers’ bargaining position and allows them to claim for higher wages. In addition, the decrease in workers’ search intensity

\(^5\)See the separate appendix for details.
reduces firms’ bargaining positions because it increases the outside option. Firms become less prone to hire workers and cut the number of vacant jobs. The labor market tightness falls and the unemployment rate increases. This is the basic story in normal circumstances. In this case the multiplier (solid black line) jumps down. One additional unit of unemployment benefits causes a 0.2 point decline in output\(^6\) on impact and involves a negative cumulative multiplier of about 0.3 in the long-run.

![Graph showing impulse response function - Unemployment benefits multiplier. Unemployment benefits increase by 1%.

At the ZLB, a rise in unemployment benefits may increase output and lower unemployment. The intuition is as follow. Unemployment benefits increase real wages. On one side it reduces the search intensity and the incentive for firms to hire. But on the other side, it curbs the decline in the marginal cost and the deflationary spiral induced by the preference shock, which dampens the increase in the real interest rate. Indeed, the liquidity trap is characterized by a zero nominal interest rate and deflation. The real interest rate is too high compared to the value that clears the market. As a consequence, the size of the multiplier hinges on 1) the size of the recessionary shock that drives the deflationary spiral and 2) the ability of unemployment benefits to create sufficient inflationary pressure to lower the real rate. If the nominal interest rate lasts several periods at the ZLB (deep recession), a fiscal policy generating inflation is likely to reduce unemployment. If the nominal interest rate remains only few periods at the ZLB, the decrease in real interest rate does not offset the disincentive effect of unemployment benefits extensions on search and hirings. A nominal interest rate held at the ZLB for seven periods increases output and

\(^6\)Since \(\alpha = 1\), \(y_t = n_t = 1 - u_t\). Then, the decline in output of 0.25 is equivalent to a proportional rise in unemployment.
reduces unemployment. The marginal multiplier becomes negative when the nominal interest rate is moving away from the ZLB as it is the case in normal circumstances. Due to the persistence of the unemployment benefits shock the cumulative multiplier is barely positive.

4.3 Counterfactual analysis

We now perform a counterfactual analysis based on the observed unemployment path. We evaluate what would have been the path of the economy, and especially unemployment, in the absence of the ZLB, the unemployment benefits extension and both at the same time. First, we build a time series for the replacement ratio based on variations in the maximum benefits eligibility duration (see Figure 3). The benefits extension is based on two programs: the Extended Benefits program (EB) and the Emergency unemployment compensation (EUC08)\(^7\). It is worth mentioning that the maximum duration strongly increased but never exceeded 90 weeks when aggregated over each states.

![Figure 3: Unemployment insurance replacement rate.](image)

We compute the shock \(\tau_t\) that reproduces the replacement rate. Second, we solve for the path of the discount factor shock that makes the simulated series of the unemployment rate as close as possible to its empirical counterpart. The path of the discount factor shock (obtained by simulations) and the replacement rate shock (calculated using the data on unemployment insurance eligibility) are depicted in Figure 4. The replacement rate increases slightly during the 2001 recession because of the automatic adjustments triggered under the Extended Benefits program. It increases sharply in 2008 according to the Extended Benefits program and the Emergency Unemployment Compensation.

\(^7\)See appendix for details.
The discount factor shock is well below zero at the beginning of the sample since the unemployment rate is quite low before the 2001 recession. It almost came back to zero and falls again as unemployment decreases. Finally, the huge increase in unemployment calls for a high discount factor which slowly decreases as unemployment declines.

Figure 4: Path of the shocks.

Figure 5 shows the simulated path for macroeconomic time series. Despite the remarkable simplicity of the model, the fit of the aggregate variables is surprisingly good. Recall that we only use one shock to reproduce the historical unemployment rate, the rest of the macroeconomic series being simulated. The simulated nominal interest rate behaves similarly to the one observed in the data. It hits the ZLB just one quarter later but stays at the ZLB until the end the middle of 2013. The model matches the magnitude of the observed deflation reasonably well. The simulated fall in the hiring rate in 2008 is not as severe as in the data but still acceptable.
The alternative scenarios are presented in Figure 6. Given the path of the shocks, an economy without ZLB would have experienced lower unemployment. For instance, a fall in the nominal interest rate to -1.3% would have dampened the rise in unemployment by about 1 percentage points in 2010. In other words, the ZLB accounts for about 20% of the rise in unemployment, in line with Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2012). As previously, a downward adjustment of $i_t$ would have prevented the real interest rate from a rapid increase. As a consequence, the lower decline in employers’ expected payoff from taking on new workers would have fostered the recovery of hirings. However, it is shown that the ZLB has a small impact on inflation.

The second counterfactual scenario (red dotted line) consists in simulating the model using the path of the discount factor shock but not the replacement rate shock. In line with the intuition of previous experiments, the unemployment benefits extension is far from having exacerbate the rise in unemployment. As the path of inflation suggests, the inflationary pressure caused by the rise in the replacement rate breaks the increase in the real interest rate. In turn, this effect offsets the decline in search intensity and the rise in real wages that makes employers less prone to post vacancies. Unemployment would have been lower in 2009Q1 since the nominal interest rate was not at the ZLB in our simulation. Thereafter, unemployment would have been higher if the US had not triggered the EB and the EUC08.
Last but not least, we remove both the ZLB and the variation in unemployment benefits in order to highlight the impact of unemployment benefits in the absence of the ZLB. The implied larger deflation would have called for negative interest rate (-3% quarterly). If the interest rate had been allowed to fall below zero, the unemployment rate would have declined by about 2 percentage points (green squared line). The reason is that making $\tau_t$ constant would have translated into a downward pressure on real wages without raising the real interest rate. Consequently, the increase in employers’ surplus would have fostered the job creation otherwise. This is nothing else than the effect of unemployment benefits in normal circumstances. We conclude that extended benefits reduce unemployment but only at the ZLB.

4.4 Robustness of results

We check the robustness of the major result i.e the increase in unemployment when no benefits extensions are triggered (under the ZLB constraint). We use alternative specifications of the replacement rate shock, different calibrations for the search intensity curvature, the cost of posting vacancies, the level of matching frictions and we introduce real wage rigidities. Figure 7 shows the variation in unemployment (w.r.t the observe rate) when the UI extension is
shut down. In most of the cases, unemployment would have declined early in the crisis. The reason is that the rise in unemployment benefits has been triggered before the nominal interest rate reached the ZLB. The standard effects of unemployment benefits apply. Differently said, if the goal of policy makers was to lower unemployment, either the central bank did not adjust the nominal interest rate downward rapidly enough, or the rise in unemployment benefits was too early. We now focus on the ZLB.

We define the replacement rate as the government expenditures in unemployment insurance per unemployed divided by the aggregate wage rate. The increase in unemployment induced by the unresponsiveness of UI benefits would have been quite similar to the initial case. This result holds when considering the cyclical component of the replacement rate as a proxy for the shock. As an additional exercise, we assume that $b_t$ does not depend on wages: $b_t = b \exp(g_t)$, $g_t \sim AR(1)$. We set $b$ so as to make the steady state unchanged. As previously, we remove the simulated shock that reproduces the replacement rate in level and in deviation from the trend. UI benefits still lower the increase in unemployment during the liquidity trap.

We now set the search intensity curvature $\eta$ equal to 1 (as in Merz (1995)) and to 3. The search intensity may have a sizeable impact on unemployment. We observe an average 0.25 percentage point decline in unemployment if $\eta = 3$. In Merz’s calibration, the unemployment benefits extension would have avoided an additional 1.5 percentage points increase in unemployment in 2009. It should be noted that if search effects have little incidence, as suggested by Chetty (2008) and Hagedorn et al. (2013), the decrease in unemployment induced by the policy could be bigger.

The contribution of labor market frictions can be determined by changing $\kappa$ and $\gamma$. Not surprisingly, more matching frictions ($\gamma$ lower) or more hiring costs ($\kappa$ higher) are likely to increase the unemployment gain from the fiscal intervention. Indeed, the mismatches between workers and jobs become higher. The policy translates more into wages than into quantities (labor flows). It results in a stronger wage pressure, which is worthwhile to lower the real interest rate. Even with a low degree of labor market frictions, we do not observe any sizeable decrease in unemployment.

Finally, we introduce a real wage rigidity in the form of a wage norm as in Shimer (2005):

$$w_t^* = aw^R + (1-a)w_t^R$$

where $a$ stands for the degree of real wage rigidity and $w_t^*$ is the wage rate in the economy. It is a weighted sum of the Nash bargained wage $w_t^R$ and a

---

8See appendix C for details.

9We remove the trend using an HP-filter with smoothing parameter 1600.
constant (the steady state level). Basically, more wage rigidities reduce the inflationary pressure but also the negative impact of wages on firms’ incentive to post vacancies. The two effects cancel out. As long as the interest rate remains at ZLB, the policy has virtually no impact when the degree of wage rigidity is high.

Figure 7: **Counterfactual analysis: Robustness of results.** Variation in unemployment in pp when the UI extension is shut down. Dark shaded area: outside the ZLB for the red dotted line. Light shaded area: outside the ZLB for the black solid line.

5 Conclusion

The novelty of the present paper is to investigate the extent to which the unprecedented unemployment benefits extension is responsible for the strong increase in unemployment during the Great Recession. The disincentive aspect of UI has been frequently pointed out as an important source of excessive unemployment but has never been studied in an economy characterized by high real interest rates. We argue that the interaction between the unemployment
benefits extension and the ZLB matters. We show that the ZLB may amplify the increase in unemployment following a demand-driven recession. Unemployment benefits extensions cause high unemployment only if the economy is outside the liquidity trap. When the nominal interest rate is held at the ZLB, its impact on firms willingness to hire is ambiguous. It depends on whether the inflationary pressure that reduces real interest rates offsets the disincentive effect of unemployment benefits extensions on hirings.

For a broad variety of calibrated parameters it is shown that the UI extension, even in the worst case considered, does not cause a sizeable increase in unemployment as long as the interest rate is held at the ZLB. Using a standard calibration, a rise in unemployment benefits reduces, not increases, unemployment. These results go in opposite directions to previous studies that abstract from the liquidity trap effects. More generally, we highlight the importance of the macroeconomic conditions, especially the behavior of the interest rate and aggregate demand, for a quantitative evaluation of unemployment benefits extensions.

We are aware that the present contribution uses a very simple and probably too stylized model. It can be extended in many directions in order to provide a better robustness analysis of UI extensions. It seems crucial to investigate alternative wage structures, the role of labor market participation, the behavior of layoffs, the heterogeneity among workers and firms and additional sources of frictions as in ?. In addition, we have left completely aside the normative implications. The welfare gains (losses) could imply different policy recommendations. For instance, Mitman & Rabinovich (2011) show that the path of optimal unemployment benefits is pro-cyclical while Moyen & Stahler (2012) and Landais et al. (2010) found the opposite. Rendahl (2012) shows that a government spending policy in a severe recession characterized by a ZLB involves a huge fiscal multiplier, reduces unemployment and is unambiguously Pareto improving. However, these issues are beyond the scope of this paper.

References


### A Unemployment insurance benefits extension

States unemployment insurance and the federal government have adjusted unemployment benefits through the duration margin. In normal circumstances and under the regular program: *Unemployment Compensation (UC)*, an eligible unemployed worker may receive unemployment benefits up to 26 weeks in most states. During economic downturn, automatic benefits extensions are triggered under the *Extended Benefits (EB)* program. The duration is 13 or 20 weeks depending on the state’s insured unemployment rate (IUR) or the total unemployment rate (TUR). In addition, the *Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08)* has been launched in 2008 and has been redefined in the ARRA context in 2009. It also increases the maximum benefits duration. Four waves called « Tiers » have been implemented. The first one (Tiers I) is effective without any conditions on states’ experience with unemployment. Tiers II, III and IV require a condition on the IUR and/or TUR to be effective.
For these purposes, we extract the series of the IUR and TUR for each state\textsuperscript{10} of the US and compute if the state is eligible for the EB and the EUC08 programs. The sum of these three programs gives the maximum duration of unemployment benefits for each state. It is weighted in order to build an aggregate indicator. We assume the weights are equal to the number of total insured unemployed workers in the state divided by the total insured unemployed workers in the US. The next step is to build a time series for unemployment benefits. We assume that the extended UI benefits, characterized by a strong increase in the maximum benefits duration, can be viewed as an increase in the aggregate replacement rate. Indeed, an increase in the duration involves a higher expected value from unemployment. Since the mechanisms behind the labor market mainly rely on the expected marginal value of employment, any rise in the benefits duration acts like a decrease in the marginal value. For this reason, a shock on the replacement rate in our model seems to be a good and tractable candidate to proxy the extended unemployment insurance benefits\textsuperscript{11}. In order to build this shock we exploit the variations in the maximum unemployment benefits duration\textsuperscript{12} calculated previously. The use of unemployment benefits duration to determine a replacement rate index is widely used by the OECD and Layard et al. (2005) for international comparisons. Basically, they determine the benefit replacement ratio by the following formula:

\[
\tau = \frac{0.6(2^{nd\text{ and } 3^{rd}\text{ year RR}}) + 0.4(4^{th}\text{ and } 5^{th}\text{ year RR})}{(1^{st}\text{ year RR})}
\]

where RR stands for replacement ratio. RR is equal to the gross replacement rate $\tau^g$ (50% in our case) multiplied by the number of weeks the unemployed worker receives unemployment benefits during the $j$-th year ($j = 1, \ldots, 5$) of unemployment divided by 53. This methodology determines a replacement rate through a duration, which is useful for our purpose. In addition, it gives less weight on durations exceeding 3 years. The RR in year 2 to year 5 are divided by the first year RR. This takes into account the declining profile of benefits. We adapt these two assumptions because we do not perform any international comparisons and unemployment benefits do not decrease with unemployment spells as long as the unemployed worker is eligible. We adapt our calculation by focusing on the first 8 quarters because the maximum duration never exceeds this spell and we assume quarterly frequencies. We also

\textsuperscript{10} We use data from each state except Virgin Island for which we do not have the entire time series. We therefore have 52 states.

\textsuperscript{11} A change in the replacement rate can be viewed as a fall in the transition rate between short-term (eligible to unemployment benefits) unemployed workers and long-term unemployed (not eligible to unemployment benefits) because it affects the average outside option of a worker in the wage bargaining.

\textsuperscript{12} It is worth noting that the gross replacement rate has remained virtually unchanged and is about 50%, depending on the familial situation.
adjust the weights every quarters in a decreasing fashion. We denote by $\tau^i_t$ the replacement rate in state $i$ and $d^i_t$ the maximum duration of unemployment benefits in state $i$. The aggregate replacement rate $\tau_t$ in the US is defined as:

$$
\tau^i_t = \eta \tau^g \frac{1}{13} \sum_{j=1}^{8} \omega_j \min(d^i_t - (j-1)13, 0), 13)
$$

(30)

$$
\tau_t = \sum_{i=1}^{52} \frac{U^i_t}{U^{us}_t} \tau^i_t
$$

(31)

We use $\min \max$ function times $\frac{1}{13}$ because it defines the fraction of the $j$-th quarter in which the insured unemployed receives benefits. If $d^i_t > 13(j-1)$, the fraction is simply one. This ensures that $\tau^i_t \in [0, 1]$ and corresponds to the OECD methodology. $\eta$ denotes the fraction of insured unemployed workers over the total unemployment workers. We take the US average rate which is equal to 0.4 over 1998Q1-2013Q2. This account for the fraction of unemployed workers that are not eligible for unemployment benefits. Recall that we focus on the average replacement rate. $\tau^g = 0.5$ is the gross replacement ratio at the steady state. $\omega_j = 0.5^j$ with $j = 1, \ldots, 8$ denote the weighting functions. Obviously, alternative functions can be considered but this basic function put more weight on the first quarters, in line with the OECD methodology. Since no maximum benefits spell exceed 104 weeks, $\omega_j = 0.5^j$ is well suited because $\sum_j \omega_j$ is close to one. $U^i_t$ and $U^{us}_t$ denote the number of insured unemployed in state $i$ and in the US respectively. The maximum benefits duration in the EB and EUC08 programs is calculated using the IUR and TUR state eligibility conditions reported in Table 3 and in Table 2 respectively. The duration and the replacement rate are depicted in Figure 3.

Finally, the shock series are determined using the AR(1) (written in a different manner):

$$
b^R_t = \tau_t w_t^R
$$

$$
b^R_t = \tau \exp(g_t) w_t^R \quad \text{Where } g_t = \rho g_{t-1} + \epsilon^g_t
$$

The shock $g_t$ must adjust to match the replacement rate $\tau^\text{data}_t$ obtained previously:

$$
\tau \exp(g_t) = \tau^\text{data}_t
$$

$$
g_t = \log\left( \frac{\tau^\text{data}_t}{\tau} \right)
$$

$\tau$ is set to be the minimum value of $\tau^\text{data}_t$. Then, we assume the shock on the replacement rate is initially equal to zero but each time positive. Assuming that $\tau > \min(\tau^\text{data}_t)$ does not change our main results.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>Program Extension of EUC08</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Maximum Weeks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 2008</td>
<td>13 weeks for all states</td>
<td>November 2008</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 2008</td>
<td>Tier I - 20 weeks for all states</td>
<td>November 2009</td>
<td>20 + 13</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tier II - 13 weeks for states with TUR &gt; 6%</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2009</td>
<td>Tier I - 20 weeks for all states</td>
<td>February 2012</td>
<td>20 + 14 + 13 + 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tier II - 13 weeks for states with TUR &gt; 6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tier III - 13 weeks if states TUR ≥ 6%</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tier IV - 6 weeks if states TUR ≥ 8.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2012</td>
<td>Tier I - 20 weeks for all states</td>
<td>September 2012</td>
<td>20 + 14 + 13 + 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tier II - 14 weeks for all states</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tier III - 13 weeks if states TUR ≥ 6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tier IV - 6 weeks if states TUR ≥ 8.5% (16 weeks if no active EB and TUR ≥ 8.5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2012</td>
<td>Tier I - 20 weeks for all states</td>
<td>September 2013</td>
<td>20 + 14 + 13 + 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tier II - 14 weeks if states TUR ≥ 6%</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tier III - 13 weeks if states TUR ≥ 7%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tier IV - 6 weeks if states TUR ≥ 9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 2012</td>
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<td>December 2013</td>
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<td>Tier II - 14 weeks if states TUR ≥ 6%</td>
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<td>Tier III - 9 weeks if states TUR ≥ 7%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tier IV - 10 weeks if states TUR ≥ 9%</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: **Emergency Unemployment Compensation 2008 (EUC08).**  
The 1st 13 weeks of EB can be triggered on via a 5% 13 week IUR if the IUR is equal to or greater than 120% of the prior 2 years' averaged IUR over the same 13 week period OR via a 6% 13 week IUR with no lookback. The 6% IUR option however is optional and as of now 12 states do not have this option enabled. The TUR triggers are completely optional and while most states do have the TUR option in effect now, many simply adjusted their law when EB was made 100% federally funded and have plans to drop it once 100% federal funding is over at the end of CY 2013. Those triggers are 6.5% and 110% of any of the prior 3 years (reverts to the prior 2 years at the end of CY 2013 as well) for 13 weeks of benefits and 8% and 110% of any of the prior 3 years (also reverts to 2 at end of CY 2013) for 20 weeks of benefits. The 5% IUR at 120% average of the prior 2 years corresponding IUR’s is not optional, while all other triggers are. As mentioned above, many states adopted the TUR trigger options when congress made EB 100% federally funded back in 2009. If congress does not extend that provision most of those states have plans to drop the TUR option.

Table 3: **Extended Benefits Program (EB).** Source: DOLETA.

## B Data sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Code</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>Rate, s.a, 16 years and over</td>
<td>Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)</td>
<td>LNS14000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacancies rate</td>
<td>Rate, s.a, Job openings / (employment plus job openings). Total nonfarm</td>
<td>Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)</td>
<td>JTS00000000JOL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hirings rate</td>
<td>Rate, s.a, total nonfarm Hirings/Employment</td>
<td>Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)</td>
<td>JTS00000000HIR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominal interest rate</td>
<td>Rate, Effective Federal Funds Rate, Monthly, Not s.a</td>
<td>Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED)</td>
<td>FEDFUNDS</td>
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<td>Gross inflation rate</td>
<td>Rate, GDP: Implicit Price Deflator, Quarterly. s.a Index 2005=100, Growth</td>
<td>Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED)</td>
<td>GDPDEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insured Unemployment</td>
<td>Number Weekly Claims Report Quarterly, Average, s.a</td>
<td>Department of Labor &amp; Training Administration (Doleta)</td>
<td>CCSA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Unemployed</td>
<td>Thousands of Persons Quarterly, average, s.a</td>
<td>Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)</td>
<td>UNEMPLOY</td>
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<td>Employment</td>
<td>Level, Civilian, s.a 16 years and over Quarterly</td>
<td>Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (BLS)</td>
<td>LNS12000000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wages</td>
<td>Level, Total Wages Quarterly, not s.a</td>
<td>Department of Labor Training Administration (Doleta)</td>
<td>TOTWAGE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment Benefits</td>
<td>Government social benefits to persons, UI Quarterly, Sum, s.a</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)</td>
<td>W825RC1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: *Data source and definitions.*
C Alternative definition of the replacement rate

We take the total government expenditures in unemployment benefits (W825RC1) divided by the number of insured unemployed workers (CCSA). We obtain a measure for unemployment benefits per insured unemployed worker (in $). We multiply this value by the fraction of insured unemployed workers in total unemployed workers. The amount is divided by the average wage per employed worker which is equal to the total wages (TOTWAGE) divided by the number of employed workers (LNS12000000). One gets a measure of the replacement based on government expenditures (see Figure 8).

When we consider the following representation of the unemployment benefits shock (top-right panel of Figure: 7)

\[ b_t = b \exp(g_t) \quad \text{Where} \quad g_t = \rho g_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t \]

\( g_t \) is such that it reproduces the replacement rate series calculated previously (OECD approach), assuming the real wage is constant. In the second case, it is such that it reproduces the cyclical component of W825RC1/CCSA.

Figure 8: Alternative measures of the replacement rate and unemployment benefits.
TECHNICAL APPENDIX (NOT IN THE PAPER)

D  Unemployment benefits multiplier

D.1 Marginal multiplier

Following Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2012) and Albertini et al. (2014), the marginal multiplier corresponds to the deviation of output to its long-run value divided by the initial increase in unemployment benefits. We denote by $UBM_t$ the unemployment benefits multiplier. In normal time, it is equal to

$$UBM_t = \frac{y_{\tau,t} - y}{b_{\tau,1} - b}$$

where $y$, $b$, $y_{\tau,t}$ and $b_{\tau,1}$ are the output and the unemployment benefits long-run values, the response of output and the unemployment benefits $b_t$ to a shock on $\tau_t$ in period 1 (upon the shock) respectively. To compute the multiplier at the ZLB we force the economy to enter in a liquidity trap for 6 periods using the discount factor shock $\beta_t$. It involves a shock on $\beta$ of $\sigma_\beta = 0.02$. Let $y_{\tau,\beta,t}$ be the response of output following a shock on $\tau_t$ and $\beta_t$, $y_{\beta,t}$ and $b_{\beta,t}$ are the response of output and unemployment benefits to a shock on $\beta_t$ only. The multiplier at the ZLB is equal to:

$$UBM^Z_{LB,t} = \frac{y_{\tau,\beta,t} - y_{\beta,t}}{b_{\tau,\beta,1} - b_{\beta,1}}$$

The size of the shock $b_t$ is set to 1%. Since the fiscal shock is temporary, output deviates from its unconditional mean on impact and returns to its long-run level in the absence of additional shock as time goes by. This calculation involves that the multiplier is computed on a constant basis (the increase in $b_t$) and ensures that the UBM returns to zero in the long-run. In order to investigate the whole gains (losses) from a fiscal intervention we analyze the cumulative multiplier which better highlights the long-run effects.

D.2 Cumulative multiplier

Following Leeper et al. (2009) and Uhlig (2010) the cumulative multiplier corresponds to the net present value of output gains relative to the increase in unemployment benefits. Output deviation from its long-run value is summed up to that date and discounted with the steady state nominal interest rate. It is divided by unemployment benefits variations discounted in a similar way. Formally it writes,

$$cUBM_t = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{t} R^{-j}(y_{\tau,j} - y)}{\sum_{j=1}^{t} R^{-j}(b_{\tau,j} - b)}$$
The main difference here is that both terms are discounted using the steady state gross nominal interest rate $R_t = 1 + i_t$. The cumulative multiplier at the ZLB is computed in the same way except that we allow for an additional shock to force the economy to enter in a liquidity trap:

$$cU\lambda M_t^{ZLB} = \sum_{j=1}^{t} R^{-j}(y_{\tau, \beta, j} - y_{\beta, j}) \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{t} R^{-j}(b_{\tau, \beta, j} - b_{\beta, j})}{\sum_{j=1}^{t} R^{-j}(b_{\tau, \beta, j} - b_{\beta, j})}$$

**E Summary equations**

**E.1 SaM model**

**E.1.1 Dynamic model**

- Euler equations:

  $\lambda_t = c_t^{-\sigma}$

  $\lambda_t = (1 + i_t)E_t \beta_{t+1} \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\pi_{t+1}}$  

- Law of motion of employment:

  $n_t = (1 - \rho^x)n_{t-1} + m_t$

- Hirings:

  $m_t = \left((e_t s_t)^{-\gamma} + \nu_t^{-\gamma}\right)^{-1}$

- Job seekers:

  $s_t = 1 - (1 - \rho^x)n_{t-1}$

- Unemployment rate:

  $u_t = 1 - n_t$

- Job finding rate:

  $f_t = \frac{m_t}{e_t s_t}$

- Job filling rate:

  $q_t = \frac{m_t}{\nu_t}$
• Worker expected marginal value of employment

$$\varphi_t = \lambda_t \left( w_t^R - b_t^R \right) - \ell n_t^\phi + E_t \beta_{t+1} (1 - \rho^x) (k(e_{t+1}) \lambda_{t+1} + (1 - f_{t+1}e_{t+1}) \varphi_{t+1})$$

(40)

$$\mu_t = mc_t \alpha \frac{y_t}{n_t} - w_t^R + (1 - \rho^x) E_t \beta_{t+1} \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \mu_{t+1}$$

(42)

• Free entry condition

$$q_t \mu_t = \kappa$$

(43)

• Output:

$$y_t = n_t^x$$

(44)

• Marginal cost:

$$mc_t = \left( \frac{n_t}{\alpha y_t} \right) \left( w_t^R + \frac{\kappa}{q_t} - (1 - \rho^x) E_t \beta_{t+1} \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \frac{\kappa}{q_{t+1}} \right)$$

(45)

• Real wage:

$$w_t^R = \xi \left( b_t^R + \frac{\ell n_t^\phi}{\lambda_t} - E_t \beta_{t+1} (1 - \rho^x) \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} k(e_{t+1}) \right)$$

$$+ \ (1 - \xi) \left( mc_t \alpha \frac{y_t}{n_t} + E_t \beta_{t+1} (1 - \rho^x) \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \kappa \theta_{t+1} e_{t+1} \right)$$

(46)

(47)

• Search effort:

$$\lambda_t k'(e_t) = \varphi_t f_t$$

(48)

• NKPC:

$$0 = (1 - \epsilon) + \epsilon mc_t - \psi \frac{\pi_t}{\pi} \left( \frac{\pi_t}{\pi} - 1 \right)$$

$$+ E_t \beta_{t+1} \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \psi \frac{\pi_{t+1}}{\pi} \left( \frac{y_{t+1}}{y_t} - 1 \right) \frac{y_{t+1}}{y_t}$$

(49)
• Taylor rule:

\[ 1 + i_t = \begin{cases} 
(1 + \rho_i \left( \frac{\pi_t}{\pi} \right)^{\rho_i} \left( \frac{y_t}{y} \right)^{\rho_y})^{1-\rho_i} & \text{if } i_t > 0 \\
1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \]  

(50)

• Unemployment benefits:

\[ b_t^R = \tau_t w_t^R \]  

(51)

• Market clearing:

\[ y_t \left[ 1 - \frac{\psi}{2} \left( \frac{\pi_t}{\pi} - 1 \right)^2 \right] = c_t + \kappa v_t + k(e)s \]  

(52)

• Shocks:

\[ \log \beta_{t+1} = \rho_{\beta} \log \beta_t + (1 - \rho_{\beta}) \log \beta + \sigma_{\beta} \epsilon^\beta_{t+1} \]  

(53)

\[ \log \tau_{t+1} = \rho_{\tau} \log \tau_t + (1 - \rho_{\tau}) \log \tau + \sigma_{\tau} \epsilon^\tau_{t+1} \]  

(54)

\[ \log \beta_{t+1} = \rho_{\beta} \log \beta_t + (1 - \rho_{\beta}) \log \beta + \sigma_{\beta} \epsilon^\beta_{t+1} \]  

(55)

E.1.2 Steady state model

• Euler equations:

\[ \lambda = c^{-\sigma} \]  

(56)

\[ (1 + i) = \frac{\pi}{\bar{\beta}} \]  

(57)

• Law of motion of employment:

\[ n = \frac{fs}{1 - (1 - \rho^x)} \]  

(58)

• Hirings:

\[ m = \left( (es)^{-\gamma} + v^{-\gamma} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} \]  

(59)

• Job seekers:

\[ s = 1 - (1 - \rho^x)n \]  

(60)
• Unemployment rate:

\[ u = 1 - n \]  \hspace{1cm} (61)

• Job finding rate:

\[ f = \frac{m}{es} \]  \hspace{1cm} (62)

• Job filling rate:

\[ q = \frac{m}{v} \]  \hspace{1cm} (63)

• Worker expected marginal value of employment

\[ \varphi = \lambda \left( w^R - b^R \right) - \ell n\phi + \beta(1 - \rho^x)(k(e)\lambda + (1 - fe)\varphi \right) \]  \hspace{1cm} (64)

• Firm expected marginal value of employment

\[ \mu = mca\frac{y}{n} - w^R + (1 - \rho^x)\beta\mu \]  \hspace{1cm} (65)

• Free entry condition

\[ q\mu = \kappa \]  \hspace{1cm} (66)

• Output:

\[ y = n^\epsilon \]  \hspace{1cm} (67)

• Marginal cost:

\[ mc = \left( \frac{n}{ay} \right) \left( w^R + \frac{\kappa}{q} - (1 - \rho^x)\beta\frac{\kappa}{q} \right) \]  \hspace{1cm} (68)

• Real wage:

\[ w^R = (1 - \zeta) \left( mca\frac{y}{n} + (1 - \rho^x)\beta k\theta e \right) + \zeta \left( b^R + \frac{\ell n\phi}{\lambda} - \beta(1 - \rho^x)k(e) \right) \]  \hspace{1cm} (69)

• Search effort:

\[ k'(e) = \frac{\varphi}{\lambda}f \]  \hspace{1cm} (70)
• NKPC:

\[ mc = \frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon} \]  
(71)

• Taylor rule:

\[ 1 + i = \frac{\pi}{\beta} \]  
(72)

• Unemployment benefits:

\[ b^R = \tau w^R \]  
(73)

• Market clearing:

\[ y = c + \kappa v + k(e)s \]  
(74)

E.1.3 Calibration

With \( \pi = 1.0055 \) and \( \beta = 0.994 \) then,

\[ i = \frac{\pi}{\beta} - 1 = 1.15\% \]

In the benchmark we impose the following values: \( \alpha = 1, \sigma = 1, \phi = 1 \) and \( \tau = 0.15 \). We set the steady state level of employment to 0.945, \( \rho^x = 0.1061 \) and \( \epsilon = 1 \).

\[
\begin{align*}
m &= \rho^x n = 0.10 \\
s &= 1 - (1 - \rho^x)n = 0.16 \\
f &= \frac{m}{se} = 0.65 \\
y &= n^\alpha = 0.945
\end{align*}
\]

Since \( q = 0.9 \) then

\[
\begin{align*}
v &= \frac{m}{v} = 0.11 \\
\theta &= \frac{f}{q} = 0.74
\end{align*}
\]

\( \gamma \) is set to balance the hiring function given \( m=0.10 \). Then \( \gamma = 2.741 \). We can find \( c \) since we set \( \kappa = 0.05 \)

\[ c = y - \kappa v - k(e)s = 0.93929 \]
Using it in the Euler equation we get:

\[ \lambda = (y - \kappa v - k(e)s)^{-\sigma} = 1.06 \]

Using \( \epsilon = 6 \) and \( mc = (\epsilon - 1)/\epsilon \simeq 0.83 \) and the job creation condition we find \( w^R \)

\[ w^R = mc\alpha \frac{y}{n} + \frac{\kappa}{q} - (1 - \rho^x)\beta\frac{\kappa}{q} = 0.83 \]

given \( \tau = 0.15 \) and \( b^R = \tau \cdot w^R = 0.12 \), one has to determine \( \ell \) that satisfy the real wage equation:

\[ \ell = \frac{\lambda}{\xi^n\phi} \left( w^R - (1 - xi) \left( mc\alpha \frac{y}{n} + \beta(1 - \rho^x)\kappa\theta \right) - \xi b \right) = 0.77 \]

Given that \( k(e) = k_0 e^\eta \) and \( \eta \) is set to 2, \( k_0 \) is obtained using the free entry condition and the Nash bargaining rule:

\[ k_0 = \frac{1 - \xi}{\eta \xi e^{\eta - 1} \kappa \theta} = 0.018 \]

### F Solution method

In order to explicitly take into account the non-linearity induced by the ZLB we use a projection method: Parameterized Expectation Algorithm (PEA). It consists in approximating the policy rules and conditional expectations of the system previously described using Chebyshev polynomials. These parametric functions display suitable orthogonality and convergence properties to minimize the error distance approximation. We consider a third-order Chebyshev polynomial over a fixe complete grid. Our strategies is all the more accurate that we approximate two policy functions: the ZLB and outside the ZLB. We merge them in the algorithm to compute the expectations. Then, one can approximate kink in all decision rules accurately. We first present some numerical technics that will be helpful for the understanding of the general algorithm\(^{13}\).

#### F.1 Model dynamic equation

Let first summarize the model equations. The competitive equilibrium in a reduced form bloc can be defined as follow:

\(^{13}\)This appendix does not intend to be a mathematical note on the algorithm but a general description on the way the model is solved using Matlab. For this reason, many variables will be treated as vectors or matrices, as we do in Matlab.
Backward looking dynamics

\[ 1 + i_t = (1 + i_{t-1})^{\rho_i} \left( \frac{\pi}{\beta} \left( \frac{\pi_t}{\pi} \right)^{\rho_{\pi}} \left( \frac{y_t}{y} \right)^{\rho_{y}} \right)^{1-\rho_i} \]

\[ n_t = (1 - \rho^n)n_{t-1} + v_t q_t \]

\[ \log \beta_{t+1} = \rho_{\beta} \log \beta_t + (1 - \rho_{\beta}) \log \beta + \sigma_{\beta} e_{t+1}^\beta \]

\[ \log \tau_{t+1} = \rho \tau \log \tau + (1 - \rho \tau) \log \tau + \sigma \tau e_{t+1}^\tau \]

Forward looking dynamics

\[ \lambda_t = (1 + i_t) E_t Y_{t+1}^1 \quad \text{if} \quad i_t > 0 \]

\[ \lambda_t = E_t Y_{t+1}^1 \quad \text{if} \quad i_t = 0 \]

and

\[ \frac{\kappa}{q_t} = mc_i \alpha \frac{y_t}{n_t} - w_t^R + (1 - \rho^x) E_t \frac{Y_{t+1}^2}{\lambda_t} \]

\[ w_t^R = (1 - \xi) \left( mc_i \alpha \frac{y_t}{n_t} + E_t \frac{Y_{t+1}^3}{\lambda_t} \right) + \xi \left( b_t^R + \ell n_t^\phi \right) \]

\[ 0 = (1 - \epsilon) + \epsilon mc_i - \psi \frac{\pi_t}{\pi} \left( \frac{\pi_t}{\pi} - 1 \right) + E_t \frac{Y_{t+1}^4}{y_t \lambda_t} \]

\[ k_0 \eta e_t^{\eta-1} = \frac{1 - \xi}{\xi} \kappa \theta_t \]

where the intermediary variables are (in the compact form model):

\[ m_t = \left( (e_t s_t)^{-\gamma} + v_t^{-\gamma} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} \]

\[ s_t = 1 - (1 - \rho^x)n_{t-1} \]

\[ f_t = \frac{m_t}{(e_t s_t)} \]

\[ q_t = \frac{m_t}{v_t} \]

\[ y_t = n_t^\alpha \]

\[ c_t = \frac{y_t (1 - \Gamma_t^\pi)}{-\kappa v_t - s_t k_0 e_t^\eta} \]

\[ \lambda_t = c_t^{-\sigma} \]

\[ \Gamma_t^\pi = \frac{\psi \left( \frac{\pi_t}{\pi} - 1 \right)^2}{2} \]

36
We define by \( \Delta_t = \{ i_{t-1}, n_{t-1}, \beta_t, \tau_t \} \) the vector of state variables and by : \( E = \{ v_t, \pi_t, w_t^R, mc_t, e_t \} \) the vector control variables.

**Expectation functions**

\[
\begin{align*}
E_t Y^1_{t+1} &= \beta_{t+1} \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\pi_{t+1}} \\
E_t Y^2_{t+1} &= (1 - \rho^x) \beta_{t+1} \lambda_{t+1} \frac{\kappa}{\eta_{t+1}} \\
E_t Y^3_{t+1} &= (1 - \rho^x) \beta_{t+1} \lambda_{t+1} \theta_{t+1} e_{t+1} \\
E_t Y^4_{t+1} &= \beta_{t+1} \lambda_{t+1} \psi \frac{\pi_{t+1}}{\pi} \psi_{t+1} \left( \frac{\pi_{t+1}}{\pi} - 1 \right) \\
E_t Y^5_{t+1} &= (1 - \rho^x) \beta_{t+1} \lambda_{t+1} k (e_{t+1})
\end{align*}
\]

According to those equations, there are five policy rules to determine \( \{ v_t, \pi_t, w_t^R, mc_t, e_t \} \) and five expectation functions \( E_t Y^e_{t+1, e} \), \( e = 1, \ldots, 5 \). The basic idea of the PEA algorithm is to approximate the policy rule and the expectation function by a parametric approximation function \( \Phi_p(\Delta_t) \) and \( \Psi^e(\Delta_t) \) respectively, which are functions of the state vectors.

**F.2 Preliminary results on Chebyshev functions**

To approximate the unknown functions: the expectations and the policy rules, we rely on Chebyshev polynomials. The domain of Chebyshev polynomials is the interval \([-1, 1]\). We will see later on how to manage an \([a, b]\) interval. Let \( D \) be the approximation order of the Chebyshev polynomial. With one state variable \( x \), the Chebyshev polynomials of order \( d \) is built according to the following recursion:

\[
T_{d+1}(x) = 2x T_d(x) - T_{d-1}(x)
\]

Given that \( T_0(x) = 1 \) and \( T_1(x) = x \). Applying the trigonometric identities \( T_d(\cos(x)) = \cos(nx) \) where \( \cos(nx) \) is an orthogonal sequence on \([0, 2\pi]\), the \( d \)-th member of the polynomial is

\[
T_d(x) = \cos(d \arccos(x))
\]

The complete Chebyshev polynomial of a variable \( x \) writes:

\[
\Phi(\varphi(x), \theta) = \sum_{d=0}^{D} \phi_d T_d(x)
\]

where

\[
\varphi(x) = 2x - a \\
b - a - 1
\]

37
a and b are the minimum and the maximum bounds of the ergodic distribution of the variable x. Then, \( \phi(x) \) maps x in the interval \([-1,1]\). \( \phi_d \) are the parameters that we have to determine to find the policy rules. When the number of state variables is higher than one, we have to build a multidimensional Chebyshev polynomial. The product of polynomial terms must have an order not higher than D. Let K be the number of state variables such that \( x = \{ x_1, x_2, ..., x_K \} \) The multidimensional Chebyshev polynomial writes:

\[
\Phi(\phi(x), \phi) = \sum_{d_1=0}^{D} \cdots \sum_{d_K=0}^{D} \phi_{d_1...d_K} \mathbb{1}_{\{\sum_{s=1}^{K} d_s \leq D\}} \prod_{k=1}^{K} T_{d_k}(\phi(x_k))
\]

Where \( \mathbb{1} \) is a variable taking the value 1 if the product of the \( \{d_1, ..., d_D\} \)-th member of the polynomial has a total order \( \sum_{s=1}^{K} d_s \) not higher than D and 0 otherwise. For instance, in our model we assume a third order Chebyshev polynomial with four state variables. For each control variable \( j \) the policy rule writes:\(^{14}\)

\[
\Phi_j(\phi(\Delta t), \theta) = \phi_1^j + \phi_2^j \phi(i_{t-1}) + \phi_3^j \cos(2 \arccos \phi(i_{t-1})) \\
+ \phi_4^j \cos(3 \arccos \phi(i_{t-1})) + \phi_5^j \phi(n_{t-1}) \\
+ \phi_6^j \phi(n_{t-1}) \cos(2 \arccos \phi(i_{t-1}))) + ...
\]

Therefore, the Chebyshev polynomial has \( \sum_{d_1=0}^{D} \cdots \sum_{d_K=0}^{D} \mathbb{1}_{\{\sum_{s=1}^{K} d_s \leq D\}} \) elements.

It should be noted that the Chebyshev polynomial obeys the continuous orthogonality relationship:

\[
\int_{-1}^{1} T_i(x) T_j(x) \sqrt{1 - x^2} dx = 0, \text{ for all } i \neq j
\]

This property states that the Chebyshev polynomials are orthogonal on \([-1,1]\) with respect to the inner product defined by the weighting function: \( \sqrt{1 - x^2} \).

### F.3 Grid of the state variables

When the number of state variables is higher than one, we need to construct a multidimensional grid. We assume a complete base or “full basis”. The complete basis is chosen instead of the popular Smolyak collocation method or tensor basis. The Smolyak collocation method (see Judd (1998), Malin et al. (2011) improves the speed of standard projection methods but it makes the convergence more difficult in a model characterized by occasionally binding constraints. Adaptive domain, cluster grid and anisotropic grid have found

\(^{14}\)For the sake of clarity we normalized the subscript of coefficient \( \theta \).
a particular attention in the numerical literature (see Judd et al. (2012) and Judd et al. (2013)). However, according to the size of our model we do not need to save on the curse of dimensionality in the sense that the algorithm converges in less than one minutes. The complete basis provides a richer basis than the others methods which purpose is useful for large scale DSGE model. Under the tensor product basis, the nodes of the grid are at least equal to the order of the Chebyshev polynomial D plus one. We simply assume that the number of nodes is \( N = D + 1 \). Following Barthelmann et al. (2000), we use the extrema of Chebychev polynomials as the basis for the grid points. \( \mathcal{G}^N = \{ \zeta^1, ..., \zeta^N \} \subset [-1, 1] \) is the set of the extrema of the Chebychev polynomials nodes. The roots of the Chebyshev polynomial of order D when the approximation order is the same in every dimension are:

\[
\zeta^n = -\cos\left(\frac{2n - 1}{2N}\pi\right) \quad \text{for} \quad n = 1, ..., N
\]

For instance, a third-order Chebyshev polynomial gives

\[
\mathcal{G}^4 = [-0.9239, -0.3827, 0.3827, 0.9239]
\]

The grid for each variable \( x_k \) at each node \( n \) is defined by:

\[
X^n_k = x_k + (\zeta^n + 1) \frac{\bar{x}_k - x_k}{2}
\]

where \( \bar{x}_k \) and \( x_k \) denote the lower and the upper bound of the domain of the state variable \( x_k \) respectively. We now turn to the computation of the grid matrix. Let \( \mathcal{I}_s \) be a vector of dimension \( s \) whose components are each equal to one. The full tensor product basis \( \mathcal{H}_t \) is a set of tensor product basis for each variable \( k \): \( \mathcal{H}_t = \{ \mathcal{H}_1, ..., \mathcal{H}_K \} \subset [-1, 1] \) where every \( \mathcal{H}_k \) can be obtained using the Kronecker product:

\[
\mathcal{H}_k = \mathcal{I}_{\mathcal{A}^{k-1}} \otimes \varphi(X_k) \otimes \mathcal{I}_{\mathcal{A}^{K-k}} \quad \text{for} \quad k = 1, ..., K
\]

\( \mathcal{I}_{\mathcal{A}^{k-1}} \) and \( \mathcal{I}_{\mathcal{A}^{K-k}} \) are vectors of dimension \( \mathcal{N}^{k-1} \times 1 \) and \( \mathcal{N}^{K-k} \times 1 \) respectively and whose elements are each equal to one. Here \( X_k \) is the column vector of the variable \( k \) that has \( N \) nodes. As previously mentioned, the function \( \varphi(X_k) \) maps each component of the vector \( X_k \) in the \([-1,1]\) domain. \( \mathcal{H}_t \) maps each combination of nodes. We add the time subscript for the grid because we will compute the next period state vector that will serve as a grid to calculate next period policy rule.

F.4 Policy rule approximations

In our model we have four control variables summarized by the vector: \( \{ v_t, \pi_t, w^R_t, mct, e_t \} \). The solution of the system maps the control variables as a function of the states
variables $\Delta_t$. In addition, due to the kink in the Taylor rule we approximate two types of policy rules: the unconstrained case characterized by $i_t > 0$ and the constrained case where $i_t \leq 0$. We define by $\Phi_g(H_t)$, $g = un, c$ the policy rule. $un$ stands for unconstrained and $c$ for constrained.

$$\Phi_g(H_t) = \left[ \Phi^1_g(H_t) \quad \Phi^2_g(H_t) \quad \Phi^3_g(H_t) \quad \Phi^4_g(H_t) \Phi^5_g(H_t) \right] g = un, c$$

Note that $\Delta_t$ has been replaced by $H_t$ because we use the tensor grid to evaluate the policy rules. The “aggregate” policy rule combines both:

$$\Phi(H_t) = \mathbb{1}_{\{i_t > 0\}} \Phi_{un}(H_t) + \mathbb{1}_{\{i_t \leq 0\}} \Phi_c(H_t)$$

$\mathbb{1}_{\{i_t > 0\}}$ is a vector which value are equal to 1 if the nominal interest rate is strictly positive and 0 otherwise. We will see later on how to calculate $i_t$. Let first rewrite some algebra to get a more compact form of the solution system. With $H_t$ being the tensor grid, the terms in the Chebyshev function over this grid (The complete basis) writes:

$$F(H_t) = \mathbb{1}_{\{\sum_{s=1}^K d_s \leq D\}} \prod_{k=1}^K T_{d_k}(H_t^k)$$

where $d_k = I_{D^{k-1}} \otimes Q \otimes I_{D^{K-k}}$ for $k = 1, ..., K$

and $Q = [1, ..., D]^T$

As before, $I_{D^{k-1}}$ and $I_{D^{K-k}}$ are vectors of dimension $D^{k-1} \times 1$ and $D^{K-k} \times 1$ respectively and which elements are each equal to one. $Q$ is a vector of dimension $D \times 1$ ($T$ stands for the transpose) and $F(H_t)$ maps each combinations of state variables in the Chebyshev polynomial. Using this, one can rewrite the policy rules in a more compact form:

$$\Phi_g(H_t, \Lambda_P^g) = F(H_t) \Lambda_P^g$$

where $\Lambda_P^g$ stands for the matrix coefficient of the policy rules defined by

$$\Lambda_P^g = \left[ \begin{array}{cccc} \phi^g_{11} & \phi^g_{12} & \cdots & \phi^g_{1K} \\ \phi^g_{21} & \phi^g_{22} & \cdots & \phi^g_{2K} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \phi^g_{S1} & \phi^g_{S2} & \cdots & \phi^g_{SK} \end{array} \right] g = un, c$$

This method approximate the solution more accurately than if we use a single Chebyshev polynomial. It allows to manage the kink in the policy rules. It is important to note that the two policy rules are linked when the expectations are computed. It means that agents take into account the probability of moving in and out of the liquidity trap when they take their decisions. The probability that the nominal interest rate hits the ZLB is endogenous and taking into agents’ expectations.
and $S$ is the number of terms when the order approximation is $D$ and the number of state variables is $K$. Formally it is obtained using the following formula:

$$S = \sum_{d_1=0}^{D} \cdots \sum_{d_K=0}^{D} \mathbb{I}_{\{\sum_{i=1}^{K} d_i \leq D\}}$$

for $k = 1, \ldots, K$

### F.5 Numerical integration

An important problem is the presence of two aggregate shocks (namely $\beta_t, \tau_t$). The expectation functions must be evaluated. For this purpose we proceed to a numerical integration using Gauss-Hermite quadratures.

#### F.5.1 Gauss-Hermite quadrature

In our case, Gauss-Hermite quadrature will be particularly useful because we are dealing with stochastic processes that have gaussian distributions. Formally we have:

$$E_t G(z) = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} G(x) e^{-x^2} dx \simeq \sum_{i=1}^{n_h} \omega_i G(x_i) e^{-x_i^2}$$

where $\mu$ and $\sigma$ are the mean and the variance of the shock respectively, $n_h$ is the number of Hermite nodes (10 in our case) and $\omega_i$ are the weighting functions that are solved numerically according to:

$$\omega_i = \frac{2^{n_h+1} n_h! \sqrt{\pi}}{H_{n_h}^2 (r_i)}$$

where $H(\cdot)$ is an orthogonal Hermite polynomial and $r_i$ are the associated roots. In the presence of multiple ($n_s$) random variables we must compute multiple integrals:

$$E_t G(z_1, \ldots, z_{n_s}) = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \cdots \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} G(z_1, \ldots, z_{n_s}) dz_1 \cdots dz_{n_s}$$

$$\simeq \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{\pi}} \right)^{n_s} \sum_{i_1=1}^{n_h} \cdots \sum_{i_{n_s}=1}^{n_h} \omega_{i_1} \cdots \omega_{i_{n_s}} G(z_{i_1}, \ldots, z_{i_{n_s}})$$

#### F.5.2 Expectations in the model

As mentioned above, the goal of the PEA is to replace expectations $E_t Y_{t+1}^\nu$ by a parametric approximation functions $\Psi(\Delta_{t+1})$ such that:

$$[ E_t Y^1_{t+1} \cdots E_t Y^5_{t+1} ] \simeq \Psi(\mathcal{H}_t) = [ \Psi^1(\mathcal{H}_t) \cdots \Psi^5(\mathcal{H}_t) ]$$
These functions are assumed to have the following representation:

$$\Psi(H_t) = F(H_t)\Lambda_E$$

where $\Lambda_E$ stands for the matrix coefficient of the expectations:

$$\Lambda_E = \begin{bmatrix} \psi_{11} & \psi_{12} & \cdots & \psi_{1n_e} \\ \psi_{21} & \psi_{22} & \cdots & \psi_{2n_e} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \psi_{S1} & \psi_{S2} & \cdots & \psi_{Sn_e} \end{bmatrix}$$

$S$ is the number of terms in the Chebyshev polynomial as previously described and $n_e$ is the number of expectations ($5$ in our model). Note again that $\Delta_t$ has been replaced by $H_t$ since we use the tensor grid to estimate $\Lambda_E$. In order to compute the expectations in the PEA procedure, one has to use the policy rules in $t+1$. To do this, we need to calculate the next period state variables, or equivalently $H_{t+1}$. For endogenous state variable we use their law of motion. Given the policy rules $\Phi(H_t)$ and the initial grid of states variable $\{H^1_t, H^2_t\}$ (being the grid of the nominal interest rate and employment respectively) the next period endogenous state vectors are:

$$s_t = 1 - (1 - \rho^x)H^2_t$$
$$m_t = (\Phi_5(H_t)s_t)^{-\gamma} + \Phi^1(H_t)^{-\gamma}$$
$$q_t = \frac{m_t}{\Phi_1(H_t)}$$
$$n_t = (1 - \rho^x)H^2_t + q_t\Phi_1(H_t)$$
$$i_t = (1 + H^1_t)^{\rho_i} \left( \frac{\pi}{\beta} \left( \frac{\Phi_2(H_t)}{\pi} \right)^{\rho_{in}} \left( \frac{n_{it}}{y} \right)^{\rho_y} \right)^{1-\rho_i} - 1$$

where $\Phi^1(H_t)$ and $\Phi^2(H_t)$ denote the policy rule of vacancies and inflation respectively. The next periods exogenous state variables $\{\beta_{t+1}, \tau_{t+1}\}$ are given by:

$$\log \beta_{t+1} = \left( I_{(n_h)ns} \otimes \rho_\beta \log H^2_t + (1 - \rho_\beta) \log \beta \right) + \left( \sigma_\beta \sqrt{2} Z_1 \otimes I_{NK} \right)$$
$$\log \tau_{t+1} = \left( I_{(n_h)ns} \otimes \rho_\tau \log H^2_t + (1 - \rho_\tau) \log \tau \right) + \left( \sigma_\tau \sqrt{2} Z_2 \otimes I_{NK} \right)$$

and

$$Z_j = I_{(n_h)^{j-1}} \otimes Z \otimes I_{(n_h)^{ns-j}} \quad \text{for} \ j = 1, ..., n_s$$
\( I_{N^K} \) and \( I_{(n_h)_{ns}} \) are vectors of dimension \( N^K \times 1 \) and \((n_h)^{ns} \times 1\) which components are each equal to one. \( n_h \) is the number of Hermite nodes and \( n_s \) is simply the number of exogenous stochastic processes (2 in our case). The Kronecker product of the first terms on the right-hand side \( I_{(n_h)_{ns}} \) is needed to get a vector of all possible combinations in \( t + 1 \), given that we have \( n_h \) Hermite nodes. For instance, if \( H_t \) is a 256x4 matrix with four state variables, \( H_{t+1} \) must be a 25600x4 matrix if, among the four state variables, there are two shocks and ten Hermite nodes. The complete basis \( F(H_{t+1}) \) with \( D=3 \) and \( K=4 \) must be a 25600x35 matrix. Given \( z \) being the \( n_h \times 1 \) vector of the Hermite nodes in one dimension, the multidimensional (quadratures) representation of Hermite nodes with \( n_s \) shocks (\( n_s = 2 \)) is given by \( \{ Z_1, Z_2 \} \). It is a \((n_h)^n \times n_s \) matrix.

The next period tensor product base \( H_{t+1} \) is equal to

\[
H_{t+1} = \begin{bmatrix} H_{t+1}^1 & H_{t+1}^2 & H_{t+1}^3 & H_{t+1}^4 \end{bmatrix} \\
= \begin{bmatrix} I_{(n_h)_{ns}} \otimes \phi(i_t), I_{(n_h)_{ns}} \otimes \phi(n_t), \phi(\log \beta_{t+1}), \phi(\log \tau_{t+1}) \end{bmatrix}
\]

Given the next period tensor product base, we compute the next period policy rules according to \( \Phi(H_{t+1}) \). It should be stressed that we have to compute the two types of policy rules and merge them according to the value of the nominal interest rate:

\[
\Phi(H_{t+1}) = \mathbb{1}_{\{i_t > 0\}} \Phi_{un}(H_{t+1}) + \mathbb{1}_{\{i_t \leq 0\}} \Phi_c(H_{t+1})
\]

Using the \( t + 1 \) policy rules it is easy to determine the values for expectation functions \( Y_{t+1}^e \). Each variables and expectation functions in \( t + 1 \) become vectors of dimensions \( N^K (n_h)^{ns} \times 1 \). For convenience, we reshape the vectors in matrices of dimensions \( N^K x (n_h)^{ns} \). For that purpose we add a second sub-
script $j$ to denote the $j$–th element of the vector. Formally it writes:

$$
\mathcal{M}_a^1 = \prod_{j=N^K(a-1)+1}^{a N^K} \mathcal{H}_{t+1,j}^3 \frac{\lambda_{t+1,j}}{\Phi^2(\mathcal{H}_{t+1,j})}
$$

$$
\mathcal{M}_a^2 = \prod_{j=N^K(a-1)+1}^{a N^K} (1 - \rho^x) \mathcal{H}_{t+1,j}^3 \lambda_{t+1,j} \kappa \theta_{t+1,j}
$$

$$
\mathcal{M}_a^3 = \prod_{j=N^K(a-1)+1}^{a N^K} (1 - \rho^x) \mathcal{H}_{t+1,j}^3 \lambda_{t+1,j} \kappa \theta_{t+1,j}
$$

$$
\mathcal{M}_a^4 = \prod_{j=N^K(a-1)+1}^{a N^K} \mathcal{H}_{t+1,j}^3 \lambda_{t+1,j} \phi \frac{\pi t_{t+1,j}}{\pi} y_{t+1,j} \left( \frac{\Phi^2(\mathcal{H}_{t+1,j})}{\pi} - 1 \right)
$$

$$
\mathcal{M}_a^5 = \prod_{j=N^K(a-1)+1}^{a N^K} (1 - \rho^x) \mathcal{H}_{t+1,j}^3 \lambda_{t+1,j} k(e_{t+1,j})
$$

$$
\mathcal{M}^\epsilon = \{ \mathcal{M}_1^\epsilon, ..., \mathcal{M}_{N^K}^\epsilon \}
$$

where:

$$
s_{t+1,j} = 1 - (1 - \rho^x) \mathcal{H}_{t+1,j}^2
$$

$$
m_{t+1,j} = ((\Phi^\gamma(\mathcal{H}_{t+1,j}) s_{t+1,j})^{-\gamma} + \Phi^1(\mathcal{H}_{t+1,j})^{-\gamma})^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}}
$$

$$
q_{t+1,j} = \frac{m_{t+1,j}}{\Phi_1(\mathcal{H}_{t+1,j})}
$$

$$
\theta_{t+1,j} = \frac{\Phi_1(\mathcal{H}_{t+1,j})}{\Phi^\gamma(\mathcal{H}_{t+1,j}) s_{t+1,j}}
$$

$$
y_{t+1,j} = \left( \mathcal{H}_{t+1,j}^2 \right)^{\alpha}
$$

$$
\lambda_{t+1,j} = c^{-\sigma}
$$

$$
= \left( y_{t+1,j} \left( 1 - \Gamma_{t+1,j}^\sigma \right) - \kappa \Phi^1(\mathcal{H}_{t+1,j}) - s_{t+1,j} k_0 \Phi^\gamma(\mathcal{H}_{t+1,j})^\gamma \right)^{-\sigma}
$$

$$
= \left( \left( \mathcal{H}_{t+1,j}^2 \right)^{\alpha} \left( 1 - \frac{\psi}{2} \left( \frac{\Phi^2(\mathcal{H}_{t+1,j})}{\pi} - 1 \right) \right) - \kappa \Phi^1(\mathcal{H}_{t+1,j}) - s_{t+1,j} k_0 \Phi^\gamma(\mathcal{H}_{t+1,j})^\gamma \right)^{-\sigma}
$$

The $\mathcal{M}^\epsilon$ matrices are obtained using a product of vectors element by element. The product operator starts every $N^K$ element in such a way that $\mathcal{M}^\epsilon$ has $a = 1, ..., (n_h)^n$ columns i.e. a column for each node of the Hermite integration. To compute the integral one has to use the weighting functions that are solved numerically. We denote by $\omega$ the vector of dimension $n_h \times 1$ of Hermite weights in one dimension. With multiple aggregate shocks, we have the following
tensor product base for the nodes:

\[ \mathcal{W}_p = I_{(n_h)^{p-1}} \otimes \omega \otimes I_{(n_h)^{n_s-p}} \quad \text{for } p = 1, \ldots, n_s \]

The numerical integration requires to make a product of weights (element by element). We use the Hadamard product (or Schur product) (label by \( \circ \)) for this purpose.

\[ \mathcal{W} = \mathcal{W}_1 \circ \mathcal{W}_2 \circ \ldots \circ \mathcal{W}_{n_s} \]

For convenience again, we reshape the vectors in matrices of dimensions \( \mathcal{N}^{K_x} (n_h)^{n_s} \). This will allow the combination of expectation values and weights.

\[ \Omega = I_{\mathcal{N}^K} \otimes \mathcal{W}^T \]

Where \( T \) stands for the transpose. Finally the expectations are obtained by multiplying the weights \( \Omega \) and the expectations element by element.

\[ \mathcal{E}^e = \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{\pi}} \right)^{n_s} \circ \mathcal{M}^e \circ \Omega \]

Each term is multiplied by \( \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{\pi}} \right)^{n_s} \) to scale the weights since, by definition, \( \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \omega_i d_i = \sqrt{\pi} \). Now, \( \mathcal{E}^e \) is a \( \mathcal{N}^{K_x} (n_h)^{n_s} \) matrix. Each column \( j \) corresponds to the value of the expectation at a particular node. When summed up over \( j \) we get the following vector of expectations:

\[ E_t \mathcal{Y}^e_{t+1} = \sum_{j=1}^{n_{\mathcal{N}_h}} \mathcal{E}^e_j \]

Finally, to parameterize the expectations we can solve for the coefficient \( \Lambda_E \) using ordinary least square as follow:

\[ \Lambda_E = \mathcal{H}_t^T \mathcal{H}_t \left( \mathcal{H}_t^T E_t \mathcal{Y}^e_{t+1} \right) \]

### F.6 Newton algorithm

\( \Lambda_E \) are determined by ordinary least square. However, \( \Lambda_P \) can not be determined in a similar way because the model is highly non-linear. Even with a given vector of \( E_t \mathcal{Y}^e_{t+1} \) and the grid of the state variables \( \mathcal{H}_t \) it is impossible to pin down the policy rules \( \Phi(\mathcal{H}_t) \). Then, we use a Newton algorithm. It determines the coefficients of the policy rules that minimize the residuals in all equilibrium equations. We defined by \( \mathcal{R}_{un} (\mathcal{H}_t, \Phi_{un}(\mathcal{H}_t), \Psi(\mathcal{H}_t)) \) and
the residuals of forward-looking equations in the unconstrained and constrained case respectively. The Newton algorithm\(^\text{16}\) consists in finding the coefficients \(\Lambda\) that minimize the residual equations:

\[
\Lambda^g = \arg \min_{\Lambda^g} \mathcal{R}_g (\mathcal{H}_t, \Phi_g(\mathcal{H}_t), \Psi(\mathcal{H}_t))
\]

### F.7 General algorithm

**Step 1** Choose the order of the Chebyshev polynomial \(D\) and the number of nodes \(N\) (which are at least equal to \(D + 1\)). Build the multidimensional Chebyshev polynomials using the following recursion:

\[
T_n(x) = \cos(n \arccos(x))
\]

**Step 2** Compute the grid of the 4 state variables, imposing the steady states to be equidistant from the upper bound and the lower bound of the grid. Use the Kronecker product to get the tensor product base \(\mathcal{H}_t\).

**Step 3** Initialize the policy rules coefficients \(\Lambda^{\text{un}}\) and \(\Lambda^{\text{c}}\) and the expectations function coefficients \(\Lambda_E\). In our case we only set the coefficients associated to the constants to be equal to their deterministic steady state\(^\text{17}\). The rest being equal to zero. At this step, you should have an initial Guess for \(\Phi^{\text{un}}(\mathcal{H}_t)\), \(\Phi^{\text{c}}(\mathcal{H}_t)\) and \(\Psi^e(\mathcal{H}_t)\).

**Step 4: Expectations**

a) Given \(\Phi^{\text{un}}(\mathcal{H}_t), \Phi^{\text{c}}(\mathcal{H}_t)\), use the Gauss-Hermite quadratures in order to compute the next period tensor grid \(\mathcal{H}_{t+1}\).

b) Compute the policy rules \(\Phi^{\text{un}}(\mathcal{H}_{t+1}), \Phi^{\text{c}}(\mathcal{H}_{t+1})\).

c) Compute the expectations \(\Psi^e(\mathcal{H}_t)\) and use the ordinary least square to pin down the coefficients \(\Lambda_E\).

**Step 5** Given \(\Psi^e(\mathcal{H}_t)\), determine the policy rules coefficient \(\Lambda^g, g = \text{un, c}\) using a Newton algorithm which minimize the residuals \(\mathcal{R}_g (\mathcal{H}_t, \Phi_g(\mathcal{H}_t), \Psi(\mathcal{H}_t))\) until reaching a criteria (\(10^{-11}\) in our algorithm). Pin down the policy rule \(\Phi_g(\mathcal{H}_t)\).

**Step 6** Check if the expectation functions are the same as in step 5 using an Euclidian norm and a convergence criterion of \(10^{-8}\) in our algorithm. Formally it writes

\[
\frac{|\Lambda^g_E - \Lambda_E|}{|\Lambda_E|} \leq 10^{-8}
\]

Otherwise, return to step 4. Repeat this procedure until convergence.

---

\(^\text{16}\)For this step we use a vectorial Jacobian computed numerically.

\(^\text{17}\)It is possible to use a log-linear or perturbation method to initialize the coefficients. But the algorithm converges anyway.
G  Accuracy of solution algorithm

G.1  Coverage of the grid points

One source of inaccuracy arises from the coverage of the tensor grid points. If simulated points are fairly outside the coverage implied by the tensor product basis, the model is not solved on points that are visited in equilibrium. This may involve potential spurious approximations. For this purpose we check if the ergodic distributions of states variables are most of included in the tensor product basis. By most of, we mean that it covers at least 95% (which is the case in our simulations \(\simeq 99\%\)). We start our algorithm with a tight grid and spread it to cover the simulated points. For the discount factor shock the minimum and maximum value of the grid points are about 3.5 times \(\pm \frac{\sigma_\beta}{\sqrt{1-\rho_\beta^2}}\). For the unemployment benefits shock it is set to 10 times \(\pm \frac{\sigma_\tau}{\sqrt{1-\rho_\tau^2}}\) to cover the estimated unemployment benefits shock that proxy the benefits extension.

G.2  Residuals in equilibrium equations

Den Haan & Marcet (1990), Den Haan & Marcet (1994) and Judd (1998) use a simple and powerful algorithm to evaluate the accuracy of dynamic models. They compute the residual of the Euler equation using Gauss-Hermite quadratures over the simulated series. We perform a similar exercise and find that the norm of all residuals are below 10\(^{-4}\) on average, which is highly acceptable.